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Recent Cases
EVIDENCE-IMPEACHIMENT-PRIOR CONTRADICrORY STATEMENTS OF A
PARTY'S OwN Wrrnws-In a murder prosecution, a witness for the
Commonwealth testified that he did not know or remember whether
he had made statements to law enforcement officers concerning the
guilty involvement of his brother, the defendant. On the theory that
the Commonwealth was impeaching a hostile witness, the trial court
admitted the testimony of the officers as to the contents of the state-
ments previously made to them by the witness. Held, reversed. Where
the testimony of a party's own witness was wholly of a negative char-
acter, merely failing to prove what was expected of him, the introduc-
tion of pror statements, on the ground they were inconsistent or con-
tradictory, statements for the purpose of impeachment was reversible
error. Webb v. Commonwealth, 314 S.W. 2d 543 (Ky. 1958).
Proof of prior inconsistent statements is one of the six accepted
grounds on which a witness may be impeached. The common law
rule forbidding a party to impeach his own witness by the use of such
statements has been widely criticized, and has been changed in many
states by statute.' Kentucky, in 1851, modified the common law rule
by adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure sec. 660, which provided:
The party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credit
by evidence of bad character, unless it was indispensible that the
party should produce him; but he may contradict him by other
evidence, and by showing that he has made statements different from
his present testimony.2 (emphasis added)
This apparently broad statute was construed narrowly3 by the de-
cision of Champ v. Commonwealth, 59 Ky. (2 Mete.) 17 (1859),
13 Wigmore, Evidence see. 905 (3rd ed. 1940); McCormick, The Turncoat
Witness, 25 Texas Law Rev. 573 (1947); Ladd, Impeaching of One's Own Wit-
ness, 4 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69 (1936).2 Renumbered Kentucky Code of Civil Procedure see. 596 (1854); cf.
English statutory modification of the common law rule, Common Law Procedure
Act, 1854, 17 & 18, Vict. c. 125, sec. 22, providing that:[A] party producing a witness shall not be allowed to impeach his
credit by general evidence of bad character; but he may, in case the
witness shall, in the opinion of the judge, prove adverse, contradict
him by other evidence, or by leave of the judge prove that he has
made at other times a statement inconsistent with his present.
a It might be argued that the accepted Kentucky rule that testimony of the
witness that he "does not remember" or "does not know" may not be impeached
by introduction of prior extrajudicial statements is not a "narrow" interpretation
of sec. 596. That is, the statement that the witness does not remember making a
prior statement is not "different from" that prior statement. On the other hand,
the writer suggests that where a witness has been given an opportunity to recall
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which, after holding that the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure
was applicable to criminal trials, held that the introduction of prior
inconsistent statements to impeach the calling party's own witness was
permissible only where the testimony of the witness at trial was dis-
tinctly prejudicial to the calling party, or clearly favorable to the
advesary.4 The holding of this case, that there existed an essential
difference between a mere denial or a refusal to acknowledge prior
statements on the one hand, and affirmative prejudicial statements
on the other, has been seized upon repeatedly by the Court of
Appeals.5
By such a rule, if the witness called by a party denies having
made or testifies that he "doesn't know" or "can't remember" if he
made certain statements, such answers will be characterized as nega-
tive statements, and the mere failure of the witness to prove what was
expected of him is said not to open the door to his impeachment by
showing prior statements on the theory they are inconsistent or con-
tradictory statements. On the other hand, where the Commonwealth's
witness to the alleged rape of a twelve year old girl not only denied
having made statements incriminating the defendant, but asserted on
the stand that the youthful prosecutrix had actually consented to the
relationship, evidence of the prior statements was admissible for pur-
poses of impeachment.6 In other cases such prior statements have been
admitted to impeach the calling party's own witness, where his present
testimony is clearly prejudicial to the calling party, or beneficial to
the adversary.?
The promulgation of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure in
the time, place, company and occasion in which prior statements were made, his
continuing insistence on a "convenient memory lapse" is in fact not only different
from his prior statement, but is actually a denial of its very existence. The result
of the Kentucky rule is to carve out for the turncoat a happy no-man's land where
he may rest without fear of impeachment or perjury prosecution. He need neither
affirm a prior statement, nor make a different statement now. He may merely let
his memory lapse.
4 The incidental ruling of this case that Ky. Code of Civil Procedure see. 596
was applicable to criminal trials has been followed expressly in Haley v. Common-
wealth, 261 S.W. 2d 439 (Ky. 1953), and Harvey v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 92,
152 S.W. 2d 282 (1941).
5 Cases where a mere denial or failure to remember did not give rise to
proper admission for impeachment are: Click v. Commonwealth, 269 S.W. 2d
203 (Ky. 1954); Coleman v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 8, 43 S.W. 2d 185 (1931);
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 277 Ky. 153, 12 S.W. 2d 308 (1928); and Couch v.
Commonwealth, 202 Ky. 677, 261 S.W. 7 (1924). Cases where evidence of prior
statements was admitted to impeach are: Commonwealth v. Strunk, 293 S.W. 2d
629 (Ky. 1956); Haley v. Commonwealth, 261 S.W. 2d 439 (Ky. 1953); and Buck
v. Kleinschmidt, 279 Ky. 569, 131 S.W. 2d 714 (1939).6Commonwealth v. Strunk, 293 S.W. 2d 629 (Ky. 1956).
7 Garrison v. Commonwealth, 122 Ky. 882, 93 S.W. 594 (1906); Blackburn
v. Commonwealth, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 181 (1876).
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1953 replaced the older Kentucky provision with the modem Rule
43.07, which provides that:
A witness may be impeached by any party, without regard to which
party produced him, by contradictory evidence, by showing that he
had made statements different from his present testimony....
Commonwealth v. Strunks held this rule to be applicable to criminal
trials, and allowed the introduction of prior contradictory statements
to impeach the Commonwealth's own witness, where his testimony
was affirmative and prejudicial. The rationale of the decision applied
the criteria accepted under the former Code of Civil Procedure pro-
vision. The holding of the present case, denying admission to prior
extra-judicial statements of a party's own witness where his present
statements are negative, indicates that the court has every intention
of interpreting the new rule as narrowly as it did the old.
This position of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in narrowly
restricting the introduction of prior extra-judicial statements to im-
peach the calling party's own witness has been criticized by both Wig-
more and McCormick. It is their position that such decisions, together
with its refusal to treat such statement as substantive evidence,9 rest
on archaic policies of common law exclusion which are currently dis-
credited, 10 ignore the likelihood that juries will disregard such fine
distinctions," and constitute a serious obstruction to the final ascertain-
ment of truth. 12 The Kentucky rule is narrower than either the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence' 3 or the American Law Institute Model Code
of Evidence. 14 Legitimate attacks on the narrowness of such a rule are
understandable from the standpoint of the party who suddenly has a
material witness he has called deny ever having made the statements
8293 S.W. 2d 629 (Ky. 1956).
0 Roberts v. Roberts, 310 S.W. 2d 55 (Ky. 1958); Model Laundry v. Collins,
241 Ky. 191, 43 S.W. 2d 693 (1931); Hays v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 184, 130
S.W. 987 (1910).
103 Wigmore, Evidence sec. 902 (3rd ed. 1940). For a full discussion of
Wigmore's entire argument against the exclusion of prior contradictory statements
to impeach one's own witness, see secs. 896-918.
11 McCormick, Evidence 77 (1954).
12 Id. at 73.
13 Uniform Rule of Evidence 63 provides:
Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness while
testifying at a hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter stated is
hearsay evidence and inadmissible, except(1) a statement, previously made by a person who is present at the
hearing and available for cross examination. ...
This is believed to be a succinct statement of the positions of both Wigmore and
McCormick.
14 Model Code of Evidence rule 503(b) (1942) provides:
Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the judge finds that the
declarant
(b) is present and subject to cross examination.
1959]
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relied on. The difficulties of a perjury prosecution against the turn-
coat witness who suddenly developes a convenient loss of memory are
obvious. Perhaps a better result is found in those decisions which
allow the introduction of prior inconsistent or contradictory statements
to impeach the calling party's own witness where the party is
actually surprised by the turncoat statement. Such an approach was
examined at length in Young v. United States.15 The test of actual
prejudicial surprise would seem to be a more workable rule than any
artificial distinction between negative and affirmative statements. It
would appear that the merely negative statement, where it is actually
surprising to the calling party, may be as devastating as any positive
assertion.16
Conclusion
The present case epitomizes the Kentucky rule as to impeachment
of a party's own witness on the grounds of prior inconsistent state-
ments. The cases dating back for almost a .century draw a clear line
of departure between the impeachibility of affirmative and negative
statements by such a witness. It is suggested that the adoption of a
rule which would allow the calling party to impeach his own witness
by proof of prior contradictory statements where the party was
actually surprised, without regard for the negative or affirmative
quality of the witness's present testimony, would better provide both
an adequate protection for the nerves of prosecutors and an adequate
check against the unwarranted introduction of hearsay testimony.
Donald D. Harkins
LEGAL ETIcs-DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGs-CONVICION FOR WILLFUL
EvAsIoN OR AvoiANcE OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXES As GRouNDs.-Sub-
sequent to the conviction of an attorney in the United States District
Court of willfully and knowingly failing to make his federal income
tax return for 1952 in violation of federal law,' the Kentucky State
Bar Association brought disbarment proceedings. The attorney con-
15 97 F. 2d 200 (5th Cir. 1938). It was the factual disposition of this case
that the calling party had not in fact been surprised, and was, indeed, using the
turncoat witness as an artifice to introduce irrelevant and hearsay evidence. For
this reason impeachment was not allowed.
16 The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Model Drug Co. v. Patton, 208 Ky. 112,
270 S.W. 998 (1925) allowed impeachment by proof of prior inconsistent state-
ments of the witness where the party calling him was surprised. The rule there
used was not defined, but the statements of the turncoat witness on the stand were
affirmative and prejudicial. Maddox v. Commonwealth, 311 Ky. 685, 225 S.W. 2d
107 (1949) which held that actual surprise of the calling party was not enough to
allow impeachment by prior contradictory statements where the statements of
the witness on the stand were not prejudicial or affirmative.
1 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 see. 7201.
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